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“Sink or Swim Together”: How the Recent Challenge to California’s 
Fuel Regulations Could Have Wide-Reaching Effects 
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey1 
Patrick Logan 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union deals with an issue that has been in 
litigation for many years.2  In an effort to curb greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions, the California legislature has passed regulations covering the sale 
of crude oil and ethanol-based fuels within the state.  Fuel producers outside 
of the state filed suit, claiming that the regulations were unconstitutional 
under the dormant Commerce Clause.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed and 
declined the invitation to strike down the fuel regulations that California had 
established. 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding did not end the debate, as the dissenting 
justices were glad to point out.  The fuel regulations still must survive 
analysis by the district court under the guidelines set by the Ninth Circuit.3  
Though there are valid legal arguments both for and against this type of 
regulation, we should also take a step outside of the law and consider the 
practical realities facing California and, indeed, the rest of the world.  
Climate change is a serious, global issue that is unique to our modern day 
way of life.  For this reason, the fate of California’s fuel regulations is 
important for the future of every state in the Union. 
 
                                                
1 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
2 See Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1086. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union first filed 
suit in 2009. Id. 
3 Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1077-78. 
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II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) prohibits individual state regulation of 
motor vehicle emissions for new cars.4  However, Congress made an 
exception in the act allowing California to adopt its own standard of 
regulation.5  Pursuant to the authority granted them by the CAA, the 
California legislature enacted Assembly Bill 32 (aptly named the “Global 
Warming Solutions Act”).6  The bill empowered the California Air Resources 
Board (“CARB”) to design regulations intended to return the state’s GHG 
emissions to their 1990 level by the year 2020.7  Transportation emissions are 
the state’s single largest source of GHG emissions,8 so CARB designed a 
three-part approach to lowering GHG emissions from the transportation 
sector specifically.9  CARB’s approach was to “reduce emissions at the 
tailpipe by establishing progressively stricter emissions limits for new 
vehicles,” reduce the number of “vehicle miles traveled” per year, and 
establish a new fuel standard “to reduce the quantity of GHGs emitted in the 
production of transportation fuel.”10 
The fuel standard applies to nearly all transportation fuels consumed 
in California currently, as well as any future fuel that may be developed.11  
CARB’s standard works by requiring fuel blenders to keep the average 
carbon intensity of their total fuel volume below the standard’s annual limit.12  
A blender’s product generates either credits or deficits, depending on whether 
                                                
4 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2014). 
5 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2014) (“The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for 
public hearing, waive application of this section to any State which has adopted standards 
(other than crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from new motor 
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, if the State determines 
that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and 
welfare as applicable Federal standards.”). 
6 Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1079. 
7 Id. 




11 Id. at 1080. 
12 Id. at 1079 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95482(a) (2011).). 
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the average carbon intensity is higher or lower than the annual cap.13  A fuel 
blender can purchase credits from other blenders, allowing them to comply 
with the carbon intensity cap despite having a deficit for the year.14  When 
implementing the fuel standard, CARB created a market to facilitate the 
buying and selling of credits between producers.15 This market was expected 
to encourage fuel blenders to develop fuels with lower carbon intensities for 
use in California, wherever the blenders were located.16 
In order to determine a fuel’s total carbon intensity, the fuel standard 
used a “lifecycle analysis.”17  This analysis took into account emissions that 
were generated during “all aspects of the production, refining, and 
transportation of a fuel, with the aim of reducing total, well-to-wheel GHG 
emissions.”18  After the total emissions were calculated, CARB assigned a 
fuel’s lifecycle a “cumulative carbon intensity value,” which they referred to 
as a “pathway.”19  CARB calculated a number of “default pathways” based 
on a modified version of the Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and 
Energy Use in Transportation Model.20  The default pathways were separated 
into regional categories.21  These regional categories were California, the 
Midwest, and Brazil.22  Even though CARB’s default pathways were 
separated by region, the total carbon intensity is what determined the value of 
those pathways, not the fuel’s location of origin.23  Fuel blenders can choose 
to either rely on one of these default pathways when reporting their GHG 
emissions, or they can register an individualized pathway based on one of 
two methods.24  The first method is to rely on part of a default pathway, but 
                                                
13 Id. at 1080 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95485(a) (2011).). 




18 Id. at 1081. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 1082. 
21 Id. at 1110; see also Appendix 1. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 1089. 
24 Id. 
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substitute some of the pathway’s average values for their own.25  The second 
is to propose an entirely new pathway altogether.26 
The fuel standard regulates both crude oil27 and ethanol.28  In 2011, 
CARB chose to incentivize the production of alternative fuels over crude 
oil.29  The provisions passed in 2011 mandated that “no crude oil could be 
assessed a carbon intensity below the market average, but newer sources 
causing higher emissions were assessed at their individual carbon 
intensity.”30  This meant that a fuel blender could only meet the fuel 
standard’s carbon intensity requirements by selling alternative fuels or 
buying credits to cover their deficits.31  CARB later amended the provisions 
to assess carbon intensity of crude oil fuels based on “either the average of 
the California market in the year of sale or the average from 2010, whichever 
is higher.”32 
In December 2009, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union et al. (“Rocky 
Mountain”) challenged the fuel standard’s ethanol provisions.33  Their 
complaint alleged that the ethanol provisions violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause and were preempted by the federal Renewable Fuel Standard.34  They 
sought a preliminary injunction.35  Then, in February 2010, American Fuels 
& Petrochemical Manufacturers Association et al. (“American Fuels”) 
separately challenged both the ethanol and crude oil provisions on similar 
grounds.36  American Fuels moved for summary judgment on the Commerce 
                                                
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 1084. 
28 Id. at 1083. 
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Clause claim.37  CARB responded by filing cross-motions for summary 
judgment on all grounds.38   
The district court granted Rocky Mountain’s request for a preliminary 
injunction and American Fuel’s motion for summary judgment.39  They 
concluded that CARB’s fuel standard “violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause by (1) engaging in extraterritorial regulation, (2) facially 
discriminating against out-of-state ethanol, and (3) discriminating against 
out-of-state crude oil in purpose and effect.”40  The district court also found 
that CARB failed to show that the Fuel Standard survived strict scrutiny.41  
The court did grant partial summary judgment for CARB, stating that the 
Fuel Standard was a permissible “control or prohibition respecting a 
characteristic or component of fuel under section 211(c)(4)(B) of the 
CAA.”42  However, they disagreed with CARB that the CAA prevented 
scrutiny of the Fuel Standard under the Commerce Clause.43 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Fuel 
Standard’s regulation of ethanol and crude oil did not facially discriminate 
against out-of-state commerce.44  They further held that the Fuel Standard did 
not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.45  The Ninth Circuit vacated the 
injunction and remanded the case to the district court.46  On remand, the 
district court must determine if the ethanol provisions are discriminatory “in 
purpose or practical effect.”47  If they are, the court must apply strict scrutiny 
to those provisions.48  If not, the court still must determine whether the Fuel 
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Standard imposes a burden on interstate commerce “that is ‘clearly 
excessive’ in relation to its local benefits.”49 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In 1957, California began statewide efforts to regulate GHG 
emissions.50  When Congress began instituting federal regulation, they 
looked to California’s efforts as a guide.51  The 1977 revisions to the Clean 
Air Act prohibited state regulation of GHG emissions from motor vehicles,52 
but Congress carved out an exception for California.53  Over the auto 
industry’s objections,54 California’s standards were established as the only 
alternative to federal clean air standards.55 
Any valid state regulation cannot violate the Constitution.  The 
Commerce Clause allows Congress “[t]o regulate commerce. . . among the 
several States.”56  While the express terms of the Commerce Clause do not 
restrain the states, courts have read in a negative implication.57  What this 
means is that modern legal theorists consider it to be the framer’s intent that 
the Commerce Clause should “prevent a state from retreating into economic 
                                                
49 Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142  (1970)). 
50 Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1109 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
51 Id. at 1110. 
52 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2014) (“No State or any political subdivision thereof shall 
adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new 
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part.”). 
53 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (“The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for public 
hearing, waive application of this section to any State which has adopted standards (other 
than crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles 
or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, if the State determines that the 
State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and 
welfare as applicable Federal standards.”). 
54 Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n, 627 F.2d at 1101 (holding that waiving federal regulation 
for California was not “arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
55 42 U.S.C. § 7507. 
56 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
57 Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337 (2008) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 3). 
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isolation.”58  This theory has become known as the “dormant Commerce 
Clause.”59 
Under a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, a court must ask 
whether the “challenged law discriminates against interstate commerce.”60  
Courts distinguish between laws which “affirmatively discriminate” against 
interstate commerce and laws which “burden interstate transactions only 
incidentally.”61  A law can affirmatively discriminate against interstate 
commerce “either on its face or in practical effect.”62  If either condition is 
shown, the court must apply strict scrutiny to the law. 63  A discriminatory 
law survives strict scrutiny only if it “advances a legitimate local purpose that 
cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”64  
However, if the law’s effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, the 
court uses a lower standard.  The Supreme Court held in Pike v. Bruce 
Church that in such a case, the law will be upheld “unless the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits.”65 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
that California’s regulation of ethanol and crude oil did not facially 
discriminate against out-of-state commerce.66  Furthermore, the Fuel 
Standard did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.67  The Court of 
Appeals also found that the district court erred in its determination that the 
regulation of crude oil was discriminatory in purpose and effect under the 
                                                
58 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 179-80 (1995). 
59 Davis, 553 U.S. at 337. 
60 Id. at 338. 
61 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). 
62 Id. (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)). 
63 Id. (citing Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336). 
64 Id. (citing Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336). 
65 Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see also Sporhase v. 
Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982)). 
66 Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013).  
67 Id. 
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Commerce Clause.68  Finally, the Court of Appeals determined that the Fuel 
Standard was subject to scrutiny under the Commerce Clause and not 
insulated from scrutiny by the CAA.69  The case was remanded to the district 
court to consider whether or not the ethanol regulations “discriminate in 
purpose or effect and, if not, to apply the Pike balancing test,” as well as to 
apply the Pike balancing test to the crude oil regulations.70 
Plaintiffs Rocky Mt. Farmers argued that the Fuel Standard’s 
regulation of ethanol and crude oil discriminated against out-of-state 
commerce and impermissibly regulated extraterritorial activity.71  Before 
answering the question of discrimination, the Court of Appeals first had to 
determine which sources of ethanol were similarly situated and, thus, should 
be compared.72  Because ethanol from all sources has “identical chemical and 
physical properties,” and ethanol from every region could end up blended 
together, the court reasoned that all sources of ethanol should be compared.73  
The court also concluded that GHG emissions generated from the electricity 
used in the creation process, the efficiency of the plants which produced the 
ethanol, and the transportation of both the ethanol and feedstock used to 
produce the fuel were all relevant factors to consider, regardless of the 
location of the ethanol producer.74  This is because “[a]ll factors that affect 
carbon intensity are critical to determining whether the Fuel Standard gives 
equal treatment to similarly situated fuels.”75 
Taking all of these factors into account, the Court of Appeals 
determined that CARB’s fuel standard did not impermissibly discriminate 
based on origin.76  Rather, fuels were regulated based on their carbon 
intensity.77  A fuel’s origin was relevant to the lifecycle analysis “only to the 




71 Id. at 1086. 
72 Id. at 1088. 
73 Id. (quoting Rocky Mt. Ethanol, 843 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1081 (quoting ISOR V-30)). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1089. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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extent that location affects the actual GHG emissions attributable to a default 
pathway.”78  The fuel standard did not protect California producers from 
outside competition.79  On the contrary, the pathways from the Midwest and 
Brazil actually have the lowest carbon intensity values, demonstrating that 
there is no preferential treatment for California producers.80 
Plaintiffs further argued that considering emissions from the 
transportation of feedstocks used in the creation of ethanol and the fuel itself 
was forbidden.81  The Court of Appeals disagreed.  The Fuel Standard did not 
isolate local Californian ethanol producers from the rest of the world; the 
transportation factor was applied evenly to all pathways, regardless of 
origin.82  Plaintiffs also argued that GHG emissions from electricity are 
“inextricably intertwined with geography” and, therefore, an impermissible 
discrimination.83  Midwest producers, who largely located their plants near 
carbon-intensive, coal-fired electrical plants, claimed their location adversely 
affected their pathway, discriminating against them over California 
producers.84  However, the Court of Appeals stated that “the dormant 
Commerce Clause does not guarantee that ethanol producers may compete on 
the terms they find most convenient.”85  Ethanol producers could find 
alternative means of power generation.86  In fact, some ethanol producers in 
the Midwest generated their own power, reducing their GHG emissions.87  
The court also concluded that the Fuel Standard did not eliminate any 
economic advantages that out-of-state producers had earned for themselves.88  
Midwest producers had access to cheap energy from coal-fired electrical 
plants because of their close proximity to those plants, but that cheap 
electricity was not “earned” by Midwest Producers.89  It was actually the 
                                                
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1090. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 1091. 
82 Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 US 137, 145(1970)). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1092. 
86 Id. at 1091. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1092. 
89 Id. 
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Midwest producers who generated their own power that earned benefits 
which were recognized through the lifecycle analysis.90 
Plaintiffs also challenged the fuel standard on the grounds that it 
discriminated based solely on origin by using regional averages for its default 
pathways.91  The court reasoned that CARB gave equal treatment to all 
regions.92  Carbon intensity values were not assigned based on a fuel’s “out-
of-state character.”93  Rather, a fuel’s carbon intensity was measured 
according to the same model regardless of its origin.94  CARB’s pathway 
scheme may have burdened or benefited certain producers, but it did so 
evenhandedly to both California and Midwest producers.95  The court 
attributed this to “the imprecision of averages rather than to 
discrimination.”96  The fact that the boundaries of the regional categories 
were set at the California state line was not fatal to the fuel standard.97  
Individual inspection of every pathway was deemed “unreasonably 
costly[,]”98 but the regional boundaries were not arbitrary.  For example, 
almost every producer of corn ethanol was located in California or Brazil.99  
In order for corn from the Midwest to reach California so that it could be 
processed into ethanol by California producers, it had to pass over the Rocky 
Mountains, raising GHG emissions from transportation.100  The resulting 
total carbon intensity of ethanol produced in California is higher than ethanol 
produced in Brazil, which has much lower GHG emissions from 
transportation.101  Therefore, it would have made little sense to place 
Californian corn ethanol in the same regional average as Midwestern or 
Brazilian corn ethanol.102 
                                                
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1093. 
92 Id. at 1094. 
93 Id. at 1096. 
94 Id. at 1082 (internal citations omitted). 
95 Id. at 1094. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1095. 
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The Court of Appeals also found that the 2011 provisions which 
regulated crude oil were not analyzed properly by the district court.103  The 
court first examined the legislature’s intent and found that there was no 
protectionist purpose in enacting the 2011 provisions.104  Since there was no 
protectionist purpose, the district court should have determined whether or 
not the 2011 provisions created an adverse effect.105  Plaintiffs did not 
present “substantial evidence” of a discriminatory effect, so the Court of 
Appeals remanded the claim with instructions for the district court to 
examine it under the Pike balancing test.106 
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the fuel standard did not 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause by regulating out-of-state 
commerce.107  The fuel standard did not impose any conditions explicitly on 
ethanol which was produced out-of-state.108  Rather than regulating out-of-
state producers directly, the fuel standard regulated “contractual relationships 
in which at least one party is located in [the regulated state].”109  “California 
may regulate with reference to local harms, structuring its internal markets to 
set incentives for firms to produce less harmful products for sale in 
California.”110  The fuel standard did not regulate any transactions outside of 
California; it only imposed requirements that out-of-state producers had to 
meet before selling their product within the state.111 
The brief dissenting opinion focused on the question of the facial 
discrimination of the ethanol regulations.112  The dissent stated that because 
the text of the fuel standard differentiated between in-state and out-of-state 
                                                
103 Id. at 1100. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 1100-01 (quoting Black Star Farms, LLC v. Oliver, 544 F.Supp.2d 913, 928 
(D.Ariz. 2008); citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970)). 
107 Id. at 1101 (citing Haley v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).         
108 Id. at 1102. 
109 Id. at 1103 (quoting Gravquick A/S v. Trimble Navigation Int’l Ltd., 323 F.3d 1219, 
1224 (9th Cir. 2003); (citing Healy, 491 U.S. at 343)). 
110 Id. at 1104. 
111 Id. at 1102-03. 
112 Id. at 1107-08 (Murguia, J., dissenting). 
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ethanol, the fuel standard was a facially discriminatory regulation.113  
Applying strict scrutiny to the provisions, the dissent believed that there were 
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives” to reducing GHG emissions, 
even if the alternative “is more difficult or costly to implement.”114 
V.  COMMENT 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Rocky Mt. Farmers Union should 
encourage state legislatures to pursue regulations designed to limit GHG 
emissions within their borders and reassure them that any such efforts will 
not be struck down as unconstitutional.  For this reason alone, the opinion 
should be viewed as a victory for environmental activists.  That being said, it 
remains to be seen whether CARB’s regulatory scheme will ultimately be 
upheld. 
An increase in global temperatures is a real problem facing the world 
today. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) defines 
climate change as “a change in the state of the climate that can be identified 
(e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its 
properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or 
longer.”115  The IPCC states that it is “unequivocal” that average 
temperatures have risen globally.116  Temperature increases have been much 
greater at northern latitudes.117  The average arctic temperature “has 
increased at almost twice the global rate in the past 100 years.”118  Since 
1961, both the average global surface temperature and average sea level have 
steadily risen, while snow cover in the northern hemisphere has decreased.119 
Climate change could have a serious impact around the world.  The 
risk of coastal erosion is expected to increase, and “many millions more 
                                                
113 Id. at 1108. 
114 Id. at 1109. 
115 Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 




119 Id. at 31. 
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people than today are projected to experience floods every year due to sea 
level rise.”120  There will likely be an increase in storm surges along the 
coasts, more frequent and intense heat waves, and an increased number of 
wildfires.121  Poor communities, coastal industries, and communities that rely 
economically on “climate-sensitive resources” will be the most vulnerable,122 
but decreasing availability of freshwater resources will affect all regions.123 
Though it is true that there are some natural explanations for climate 
change, the rise in GHG levels has been directly linked to rising 
temperatures.124  GHGs “affect the absorption, scattering and emission of 
radiation within the atmosphere and at the Earth’s surface.”125  GHGs, like 
the carbon dioxide emitted during the burning of fossil fuels, absorb energy 
and “act like a blanket, making Earth warmer than it would otherwise be.”126  
The IPCC claims that between 1970 and 2004, the largest increase in GHG 
emissions came from “energy supply, transport and industry.”127  Significant 
for our purposes, the IPCC further states that the global increase in carbon 
dioxide levels is “due primarily to fossil fuel use.”128 
Rising GHG emissions are a global problem, but the majority opinion 
in Rocky Mt. Farmers Union correctly states that California has a heightened 
interest in the GHG emissions produced outside of its borders.129  “With its 
long coastlines vulnerable to rising waters, large population that needs food 
and water, sizable deserts that can expand with sustained increased heat, and 
vast forests that may become tinderboxes with too little rain, California is 
                                                
120 Id. at 48. 
121 Advancing the Science of Climate Change, Division of Earth & Life Studies of the 
National Academies 1-2 (2010), http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materials-
based-on-reports/reports-in-brief/Science-Report-Brief-final.pdf. 
122 Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, supra note 115, at 48.   
123 Id. at 49. 
124 Id. at 36-37. 
125 Id. at 37. 
126 Causes of Climate Change, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/causes.html (last visited May 
7, 2015). 
127 Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, supra note 115, at 48.   
128 Id. at 37. 
129 Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1090 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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uniquely vulnerable to the perils of global warming.”130  Taking this reality 
into account, the majority did not want to handicap California’s efforts to 
combat global warming.  Stating that the dormant Commerce Clause is not a 
“blindfold,” the majority made clear that in addition to examining the law, 
they also based their holding on the practical realities facing our planet 
today.131  The majority was hopeful that, if successful, CARB’s regulations 
would “help ease California’s climate risks and inform other states as they 
attempt to confront similar challenges.”132  But did the majority go too far 
outside of the law in this case? 
While CARB’s regulations were aimed only at fuels sold within 
California’s borders, one cannot dispute that they will affect how out-of-state 
producers act.133  In fact, the regulations are intended to affect the behavior of 
out-of-state producers, and CARB acknowledged that the regulations would 
“reduce the volume of fuels that are imported from other states.”134  The 
dissent argued that this is exactly the kind of economic regulation that 
Supreme Court precedent was intended to abolish.  However, Justice Gould, 
the author of the Ninth Circuit’s majority opinion, interprets precedent as 
only prohibiting California from regulating “wholly out-of-state 
transactions.”135  In his view, a state may regulate commerce within its 
borders even if the goal of such regulation is to influence out-of-state choices 
made by producers.136  Justice Gould’s interpretation won the day, and based 
on the Ninth Circuit’s extensive review of the facts, it is difficult to imagine 
the district court striking down the Fuel Standard on remand.137  But if the 
Supreme Court decided to take up the issue, how might they interpret their 
                                                
130 Id. at 1106. 
131 Id. at 1107. 
132 Id. 
133 Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 517 (9th Cir. 2014) (denying 
petitioner’s motion for rehearing). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 512. 
136 Id. 
137 Shelly Welton, Ninth Circuit Rejects Constitutional Challenge to California’s Low 
Carbon Fuel Standard, Climate Law Blog (Sept. 19, 2013), 
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2013/09/19/ninth-circuit-rejects-
constitutional-challenge-to-californias-low-carbon-fuel-standard/. 
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own precedent?  There is case law supporting Justice Gould’s 
interpretation,138 but the answer is far from clear. 
If the fuel standard had been held unconstitutional, there is the 
possibility that a nondiscriminatory means of reaching the same result could 
exist.  In the lower court opinion, which was reversed and remanded by the 
Ninth Circuit, Judge Lawrence O’Neill suggested a “tax on fossil fuels” as a 
nondiscriminatory means to reducing GHG emissions.139  However, it is 
doubtful that an increased tax on gasoline is currently politically feasible.  A 
ruling by the Supreme Court that CARB’s ethanol and crude oil regulations 
are unconstitutional could essentially be a death sentence for CARB’s fuel 
standard and prevent other states from enacting their own regulatory 
schemes.  If the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 
CARB’s ability to meet their GHG emission goals would be severely limited.  
More importantly, there could be serious damage done to the environment if 
the Court ignored the reality that all aspects of fuel production must be 
scrutinized to effectively reduce GHG emissions. 
Transportation is the largest source of GHG emissions in California, 
making up 37.6 percent of California’s “emission inventory” in 2011.140  Of 
all methods of transportation, on-road vehicles are the greatest 
contributors.141  After the California legislature enacted the “Global Warming 
Solutions Act of 2006” and the governor issued his executive order directing 
CARB to reduce GHG emissions attributable to the fuel market,142 GHG 
emission levels from on-road transportation dropped dramatically.  Between 
2007 and 2008, emissions dropped by 5.9 percent and have continued to 
decrease over time.143  The data shows that ever since CARB was directed to 
                                                
138 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2003). 
139 Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1093-1094 (E.D. Cal. 
2011). 
140 California Environmental Protection Agency Air Resources Board, California 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Inventory: 2000 – 2012, i, 23 (May 2014), 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/pubs/reports/ghg_inventory_00-12_report.pdf. 
141 Id. at i.Over 90 percent of total emissions from the transportation sector come from 
on-road vehicles. Id. 
142 Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1080 (9th Cir. 2013). 
143 California Greenhouse Gas Emission Inventory: 2000 - 2012, supra note 140, at 11. 
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regulate fuel emissions in 2007, there has been a significant impact in the 
amount of GHG emissions from on-road transportation. 
The dissenting Justices on the Ninth Circuit eagerly pointed to the 
admission by CARB that their regulatory scheme will have “little to no effect 
in averting the environmental catastrophe” posed by global warming.144  
While it’s true that CARB’s regulations will not single-handedly stem the 
tide of increasing GHG emissions, the data proves that the regulations do 
have an effect.  Justice Gould reminded the dissent “that incremental change, 
when aggregated, can be significant.”145  Furthermore, he was hopeful “that 
successful experimentation by California could lead to broader action by 
other states and/or the federal government.”146   
Broader action is exactly what is being contemplated in other states, 
and their attention is focused on California as they decide how to act.  
California is currently the only state to have implemented a low-carbon fuel 
standard.147  The state of Washington used CARB’s fuel standard as a basis 
for a fuel standard that was evaluated by the Washington Department of 
Ecology.148  Additionally, eleven Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states 
formed a coalition to develop a low-carbon fuel standard based on 
California’s regulations.149  Because CARB’s regulations serve as the 
template for other states contemplating regulations of their own, a successful 
constitutional challenge to CARB’s Fuel Standard could seriously hinder 
current and future efforts to reduce GHG emissions. 
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145 Id. at 511. 
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147 Mike Gillett, Low-Carbon Fuel Standard Fight Erupts in Washington State, 




149 California Environmental Protection Agency Air Resources Board, Proposed 
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It’s worth keeping in mind the purpose behind the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  The driving principle behind the theory is that the 
Commerce Clause should “prevent a state from retreating into economic 
isolation.”150  Writing for the majority in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,151 
Justice Cardozo stated “[the Constitution] was framed upon the theory that 
the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the 
long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”152  When 
Justice Cardozo wrote those words in 1935, he could not have foreseen how 
relevant they would be to environmental law today.  The fuel regulations 
instituted by CARB are not an attempt to cut California’s economic ties with 
other states, but rather they reflect the growing awareness of the dangers of 
rising GHG emissions and the need to react appropriately.  California knows 
that they cannot resolve the climate change crisis on their own.153  CARB’s 
efforts should be seen as a call to arms to other state legislatures.  In the spirit 
of Justice Cardozo’s words, the states should join together to attack growing 
GHG emissions; any single state’s efforts will not be enough standing alone. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
With their holding in Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, the Ninth Circuit 
attempted to encourage states to be proactive in tackling the global problem 
of increasing GHG emissions.  Legislatures in other states should take the 
initiative and follow California’s lead.  If fuel regulations are put in place 
across the country, producers will have to adapt and we could see a 
significant drop in the amount of GHG emissions nationwide.  Reducing the 
level of GHG emissions means slowing the advance of climate change, which 
is a goal that all states, not just California, should share.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Rocky Mt. Farmers Union is a step towards advancing that goal, 
and the future of CARB’s Fuel Standard will have important implications for 
lawmakers across the nation. 
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